Detecting money laundering linked to corruption and bribery requires attention to financial patterns that differ meaningfully from other laundering predicate offences, reflecting the specific mechanics through which corrupt proceeds typically move.

Unusual payment patterns to or from government-adjacent entities are a foundational red flag: consulting fees, facilitation payments, or "commission" structures paid to intermediaries with unclear deliverables, particularly where those intermediaries have documented connections to public officials or government decision-making processes, warrant close scrutiny.

Shell company and intermediary layering specifically designed to obscure the ultimate recipient of a payment is a second consistent pattern: corrupt payments are rarely made directly to the official involved, but rather routed through consulting arrangements, related-party transactions, or offshore intermediary structures whose primary function is distancing the payment from its ultimate corrupt purpose.

Disproportionate wealth relative to declared income is a third key indicator, particularly relevant to politically exposed persons (PEPs) and their associates: asset acquisitions, investments, or lifestyle indicators inconsistent with a public official's declared salary and known legitimate income sources are among the most reliable indicators across corruption-linked laundering cases internationally.

Contract and procurement irregularities represent a fourth pattern specific to organisations with government contracting exposure: unusually favourable contract terms, waived competitive bidding requirements, or contract awards to entities with no genuine capability to perform the underlying work all suggest a corrupt relationship that may be layered through subsequent financial transactions.

Charitable and political contribution structuring rounds out the pattern set: donations or contributions that appear designed to curry favour with officials or their associated causes, particularly when timed around specific regulatory decisions or contract awards, warrant the same scrutiny applied to more direct forms of payment.

For compliance officers and internal auditors, building these corruption-specific red flags into standard AML monitoring — rather than relying on generic transaction monitoring alone — closes a gap that is specifically relevant given current enforcement priorities.